This article reviews the standard economic and cognitive models of decision making under risk and describes the psychological assumptions that underlie these models. It then reviews important motivational factors that are typically underemphasized by the standard theories, including the motivation to protect one's self-image from failure and regret. An integrated view of decision making is offered on the basis of a more comprehensive set of psychological assumptions.
Why do people often prefer a bird in the hand to two in the bush? More generally, why do people often choose a certain outcome to a risky outcome? Answering such questions is central to understanding how people make the decisions they face everyday. Should I continue work on an established line of research or branch offinto a new, unproven line that could yield a major contribution to the field but might also yield nothing at all? Should I invest my year-end bonus in a certificate of deposit (CD) that is guaranteed to pay a return of 8%, or should I invest it in a high-risk stock that might pay a much larger return but could also pay no return at all? Finally, should I have dinner tonight at a restaurant I am always reasonably satisfied with, or should I have dinner at a restaurant that has occasionally served an outstanding meal but at other times has served a mediocre meal?
Decision theorists assume that people's preferences for safety or risk depend on two factors: the value people ascribe to the outcomes of different courses of action and the probability that each of the outcomes will occur. This way of characterizing the decision process focuses on two questions: (a) How do people place a value on the outcomes of their decisions? and (b) How do people assess uncertainty and risk? Standard answers to these questions have appealed to cognitive and psychophysical factors underlying decision processes. The three most important theories of choice in this tradition are cardinal utility theory (Bernoulli, 1738 (Bernoulli, /1954 , prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) , and expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) . Although these theories make somewhat different assumptions about the mechanisms that determine the subjective representations of objective outcomes and probabilities, they all emphasize that decisions are a function of the probabilities and values of the outcomes of each alternative.
In this article, I argue that the traditional expectancy-value theories of choice either have ignored important psychological mechanisms that lead to risk preference or have postulated psychological mechanisms that incompletely or inadequately describe many actual decisions. Many decisions can be understood in terms of a desire to avoid the unpleasant psychological consequences that result from a decision that turns out poorly. Making a choice can be threatening to the self because a poor outcome can undermine one's sense of competence as a decision maker. This view yields predictions and results different from the traditional expectancy-value models of choice. By ignoring the eifect that making a choice has on the self-esteem of the decision maker, the traditional view has overlooked important psychological processes underlying choice.
I begin by reviewing the expectancy-value perspective of choice as presented in cardinal utility theory, prospect theory, and expected utility theory. I go on to discuss a contrasting perspective that incorporates motivational and affective factors into standard expectancy-value choice models. These theories include such factors as fear of failure and regret. The assumption these theories make is that people are concerned with how the outcome of a decision is going to make them feel about the decision itself. A comprehensive model of decision making is presented that describes how people defend themselves against adverse psychological consequences. Implications for other aspects of the decision-making process are discussed.
of action thaT have the same or higher expected value. This phenomenon is known in the decision-making literature as risk aversion. It has been demonstrated empirically many times (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Schoemaker, 1980) . For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) asked subjects to choose between (a) winning $3,000 for certain (80%) and (b) winning $4,000 with an 80% probability (20%). Kahneman and Tversky found that the majority of the subjects preferred the certain gain to the chance of winning a larger gain. (In the original study, these questions were posed to Israeli subjects and denominated in Israeli pounds. At the time of the study, winning 3,000 Israeli pounds was equal to winning a family's monthly income.)
Although risk aversion has commonly been assumed to hold for all decisions (Arrow, 1971) , many exceptions have been documented. For example, there is consistent evidence that people prefer to take risks when making a choice between a certain loss and a risky loss (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . For example, Kahneman and Tversky asked subjects to choose between (a) losing $3,000 for certain (8%) and (b) losing $4,000 with an 80% probability (92%). In this case, most people preferred the risky alternative. The tendency to favor a gamble that has the same or lower expected value than a certain outcome is known in the decision-making literature as risk seekingness or risk proneness.
I am restricting my examination of risk preference to choices among alternatives that yield a single, nonzero outcome with some probability greater than 0 (up to 1.0) and that otherwise yield nothing. A risk-averse alternative is defined as a lottery with a higher probability of success than another alternative of the same or higher expected value; a risk-seeking alternative is defined as a lottery with a lower probability of success. This conception of risk is consistent with standard definitions of risk aversion and risk seeking (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) , although there are many other conceptions of risk that would lead to different ways of categorizing given alternatives (Yates, 1990; Yates & Stone, 1992) . The examination of risk preference is also restricted to choices between alternatives for which the likelihoods of outcomes are objectively known. Although this assumption fails to hold in many actual decision situations, it is a standard starting point for most theories of decision making.
What leads people to be risk seeking or risk averse? The explanations offered tend to fall into two categories: universal explanations and individual-difference explanations (cf. Lopes, 1987) . Universal explanations posit that there are basic psychological mechanisms that are true of all people. They also propose that the nature of physical enjoyment and of cognitive judgment are similar for all people. Two of the most prominent universal theories are cardinal utility theory and prospect theory. Individual-difference explanations, however, offer no general explanations for risk preference. These theories assume that risk preference is a function of individual differences in attitudes and motivation. The most prominent individual-difference theories are expected utility theory, Atkinson's (1957) theory of achievement motivation, and Lopes's (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986 ) theory of security motivation. In the next section, I review the universal explanations of risk preference.
Universal Theories

Cardinal Utility Theory
The earliest explanation of risk preference was a psychophysical one. In 1738, Bernoulli (1738 Bernoulli ( /1954 proposed that money has diminishing marginal value-that is, enjoyment does not increase proportionately with increases in wealth. The psychological justification for this assumption was that each successive increase in wealth is used to satisfy less important needs (Jevons, 1871) . Because money is valuable only to the extent that it is useful for meeting needs, it becomes less useful once the most important needs have been met (e.g., water, food, clothing, and shelter). Consequently, only less important needs remain. The concavity of the utility function in Figure 1 reflects the fact that small gains are proportionately more valuable than large gains. In making decisions under risk, people prefer certain, small gains to risky, large gains. To illustrate this point, imagine once again that you must choose between (a) gaining $3,000 for certain and (b) having an 80% chance of gaining $4,000. According to Bernoulli, although the additional $4,000 is more valuable than the additional $3,000, the $4,000 will provide proportionately less satisfaction than the $3,000. Thus, when choosing between a certain gain of $3,000 and an 80% chance of gaining $4,000, the extra satisfaction afforded by the $1,000 difference is not enough to offset the 20% chance of gaining nothing.
The concept of diminishing marginal utility became a cornerstone of economics in the 19th century. Four economists, Gossen (1854 Gossen ( /1983 , Jevons (1871) , Menger (1871 Menger ( /1950 , and Walras (1874 Walras ( /1954 , independently developed the idea of marginal utility analysis to explain how choices are made under certainty (J. F. Bell, 1967) . For example, Jevons (1871) observed that "the final degree of utility" (p. 62) that comes from the addition of one more unit to a stock of goods "varies with the quantity of a commodity and ultimately decreases as that quantity increases" (p. 62). Thus, most goods have diminishing marginal utility: The first orange one eats is more delectable than the second, the third is less enjoyable, and the sixth is a cloying, sticky mess. (Exceptions to this point are cases in which there is a threshold effect of some sort, such as with alcohol. In this case, the numbing sixth beer may be more enjoyable than any of the first five.)
Prospect Theory
The cardinal utility explanation of risk preference has been adopted and modified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in prospect theory. Like Bernoulli (1738 Bernoulli ( /1954 ), Kahneman and Tversky offer a psychophysical explanation of risk preference. They propose that the same psychological properties that un- derlie the perception of physical stimuli also underlie the evaluation of monetary outcomes. The particular perceptual properties they identify are (a) subjective experience is a concave function of the magnitude of physical change, which is the same assumption made by cardinal utility theory, and (b) the perceptual system is sensitive to changes in stimulus level rather than to absolute magnitudes. The second assumption implies that decision outcomes are evaluated in terms of changes from a reference point, which is usually a person's current state of wealth. As a result, diminishing marginal value applies to gains and to losses rather than to overall wealth. So, just as large gains do not add much more to overall enjoyment than do small gains, large losses do not subtract much more from overall enjoyment than do small losses. The difference in how gains and losses are valued is captured in prospect theory's S-shaped value function depicted in Figure 2 . As a result of these differences between gains and losses, prospect theory makes the same prediction as does cardinal utility theory in choices that involve gains (i.e., people will be risk averse) but predicts that people will be risk seeking in choices that involve losses. For example, in the choice between (a) a certain $3,000 loss and (b) an 80% chance of losing $4,000, the value function implies that a $4,000 loss is not much more painful than a $3,000 loss. Therefore, people prefer to take their chances on the $4,000 loss rather than settle for a certain $3,000 loss. This change in preferences from risk aversion in gains to risk seeking in losses is called the reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) .
At the heart of both cardinal utility theory and prospect theory lies the same psychophysical explanation for risk preference: The psychological intensity of an outcome diminishes with its magnitude. The similarity between the two theories is readily apparent in the functions they propose. The only difference is that prospect theory assumes decisions are based on changes in wealth rather than on final states of wealth.
Note that the psychophysical explanation for risk preference actually has nothing to do with risk. For both the cardinal utility function and the prospect theory value function, risk preference is just a by-product of how people value relative outcomes. However, it seems obvious that people's preferences may depend not only on how they value objective outcomes but also on how they feel about risk. Cardinal utility theory is completely deficient in this regard. It does not discuss perceptions of or reactions to risk. Prospect theory, on the other hand, does consider how people's perceptions of risk affect their choices. According to prospect theory, people give disproportionately greater weight to certain outcomes than to uncertain outcomes. The explanation for this phenomenon is once again an analogy to perception: There is a category break between certainty and probabilities that are less than certain. Psychologically, there is a large difference between a probability of 1.00 and a probability of .99. The result is that the overweighting of certainty reinforces the risk preferences produced by the value function: Certain gains become even more desirable, and certain losses become even more aversive.
The strength of the universal theories is that they are elegant. They propose that a single, hardwired mechanism guides the decisions of all people. In this respect, however, the approach may be too general and too basic. The psychophysical approach to decision making fails to capture some of the more human aspects of decision making. In fact, it appears to describe the behavior not just of humans but of nonhumans as well. For example, prospect theory has been translated into reinforcement theory terms and applied to research on animal learning (Rachlin, 1989; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986) . In addition, empirical tests of prospect theory have yielded mixed support for the reflection effect prediction. The results have been particularly weak when risk preference for gains and losses was examined within the same individual (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) . This suggests that other factors that affect decisions are not included in the prospect theory account.
Overall, there are two major shortcomings to the psychophysical approach to explaining risk preference. First, it does not consider the possibility that people might have affective responses to risk itself. Second, it assumes that basic psychological mechanisms governing judgments of risk and value are common to all humans. Although Kahneman and Tversky (1982) mention that "individuals differ in their attitudes toward risk and toward money" (p. 164), the psychophysical theories do not predict any differences between people or describe psychological mechanisms that would produce such differences. 1 1 An individual-difference interpretation of prospect theory has been suggested and investigated by several researchers (Cohen, Jaffray, & Said, 1985 Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) . These researchers examined whether a subset of subjects has a tendency to feel disproportionately more pleasure or pain with large changes from their reference. This tendency preserves the two key features of the psychophysical explanation: (a) people make judgments on the basis of reference points and (b) people's response to changes are consistent, either showing diminishing marginal value, as proposed by prospect theory, or increasing marginal value. If a subset of subjects showed increasing marginal value, this would be mani-
Individual-Difference Theories
Individual-difference theories of risk preference are fundamentally different from the universal theories. The individualdifference theories are more comprehensive: They propose that risk preference is a function of characteristics of the individual. In a recent review of the individual-difference approach to risk taking, Bromiley and Curley (1992) concluded that, in general, the work on individual differences has been long on unintegrated descriptions of demographic and personality correlates of risk taking but short on theoretical explanations. However, in the field of decision making, there are three important theories that do provide a framework for understanding individual differences in risk preference. Of these, the most prominent theory is expected utility theory, which explicitly describes procedures for assessing individual differences in feelings about risk. The other two theories, Atkinson's (1957) theory of achievement motivation and Lopes's (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986 ) theory of security motivation, examine how people's motivational needs determine their preferences for risk.
Expected Utility Theory
Expected utility theory does not make any assumptions about the psychological origins or experience of utilities. Rather, its goal is purely descriptive. It seeks to summarize individuals' preferences for outcomes, to check for inconsistencies, and to predict future choices. As long as people's choices are consistent, a utility function can be derived that can capture any type of risk preference: risk averse, risk seeking, risk neutral, or any combination of these. For example, to account for the possibility that a person might buy insurance (a risk-averse act) and play the lottery (a risk-seeking act), Friedman and Savage (1948) demonstrated that a utility function defined over wealth could be constructed that contained both risk-averse and risk-seeking segments. Other modifications of expected utility theory have abandoned the assumption that utility is defined over wealth and have incorporated the prospect theory assumption that utility is defined over changes in wealth.
The psychological factors producing curves of various shapes are not considered explicitly in the theory. However, two factors have been discussed in the decision literature as producing risk preference: (a) the value of the outcomes under certainty, which is identical to the cardinal conception of utility previously discussed, and (b) the attitude the person has about risk. Thus, the reason a person is risk averse is ambiguous. It is not possible to tell whether the person actually derives less value from additional units of money, as the 19th-century economists assumed, or whether the person simply dislikes risk. The expected utility function contains both elements (for an overview, see Schoemaker, 1982) .
Tested as risk seeking in gains and risk aversion in losses. Several studies have found that this pattern is extremely rare (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) , and two studies by Said (1985, 1987) have found that there is no systematic relationship between preferences in gains and preferences in losses. These results indicate that there is no empirical support for the individual-difference interpretation of the psychophysical approach.
To grapple with this problem, a number of techniques have been developed to separate the value of money from feelings about risk. These factors can be unconfounded by first having a person assess the values of outcomes under certainty, which yields a measure equivalent to a cardinal utility function. Then the same person can make a series of choices under uncertainty, which is used to derive an expected utility function. The person's risk attitude can be measured by examining the difference between the cardinal utility function and the expected utility function, thereby isolating that component of risk preference that is due to like or dislike for risk rather than to diminishing marginal value (Barren, von Winterfeldt, & Fischer, 1984; D. E. Bell & Raiffa, 1988; Dyer & Sarin, 1979 Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Pratt, 1964; see Briys, Eeckhoudt, & Louberge, 1989 , for a discussion of measuring risk preference when risk is partially under the control of the decision maker). Although there are some theoretical and practical limitations of this approach (Bromiley & Curley, 1992) , it is a step toward a more comprehensive theory.
Expected utility theory has proven problematic as a descriptive theory of choice, and many empirical violations have been documented (Ellsberg, 1961; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968 Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) ; nonetheless, expected utility theory and its modifications offer two improvements over the universal theories from a heuristic viewpoint. First, it recognizes that people may hold attitudes about risk per se. Second, it recognizes that there are individual differences in preferences about risk. Expected utility theory's weakness, however, is that it is short on psychological explanations for why people would hold specific attitudes about risk or why there would be differences between people. The model treats risk preference as just another preference: It is a given, and its psychological origin is unquestioned. This is similar to the way risk preference is treated when it is measured as a personality trait, such as sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1979) . Such scales in and of themselves are simply a description of risk preference rather than an explanation. Clearly, the intent behind the development of these measures is to relate them to explanatory variables. For example, Zuckerman, Simons, and Como (1988) have provided research showing that there is a biological basis for sensation seeking (cited in Bromiley & Curley, 1992) . Additional insights concerning the reaction to risk are provided by the motivational theories of Atkinson (1957) and Lopes (1987) .
Motivational Theories
Although expected utility theory allows for individual differences in attitudes about risk, it does not describe any sort of psychological mechanism that underlies risk attitudes. Several other individual-difference theories have, however, attempted to fill in the psychological gaps left by expected utility theory (Atkinson, 1957 (Atkinson, ,1983 Atkinson & Raynor, 1978; Lopes, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) . These theories focus on how motivation influences people's attitudes about risk. They propose that people do not simply respond to the enjoyment that outcomes provide, as the psychophysical theories suggest, nor do they simply have a set attitude about risk. Rather, people respond to the emotional consequences of making a decision that come from self-awareness and a sense of agency: feelings of success and failure, elation and disappointment, efficacy and impotence, rejoicing and regret. The motivational theories propose that the choices people make are often the result of a compromise between two competing desires. On the one hand, people want to choose the option that maximizes their outcomes (in terms of the value of the outcome); on the other hand, they want to avoid making poor decisions that may engender feelings of failure or disappointment. The tension between these two motives pushes decision makers toward a specific level of risk-seeking behavior.
The most prominent of these motivational theories is Atkinson's (1957 Atkinson's ( ,1983 Atkinson & Raynor, 1978) theory of risk taking. Drawing on work from both social psychology (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944) and personality psychology (McClelland, 1951) , Atkinson proposed a model of risk taking based on individual differences in motivation. The social psychological component of the model describes what amount of risk provides people with the greatest sense of achievement. In Atkinson's model, people are assumed to undertake actions that maximize feelings of achievement, which increase with the difficulty of the task. When the probability of success is high, it provides very little personal satisfaction when it occurs-it's like shooting fish in a barrel. When the probability of success is low, people feel a great deal of satisfaction from having the skill to overcome the odds and achieve success. These intuitions suggest that satisfaction with achieving success is negatively related to the probability of success (1.00 -p). Of course, people are not likely to succeed at the very hardest tasks. Therefore, to determine the level of risk that has the highest expected value, satisfaction must be weighed against the probability of success. The task that provides the optimal level of risk is the one that maximizes expected satisfaction, p(l -00 -p), which reaches a maximum value when the probability of success is .50. The model predicts that people will prefer to engage in tasks at which they expect to succeed half the time.
People differ, however, in the extent to which they are motivated to achieve, and some people are actually far more concerned with avoiding failure than with achieving success (McClelland, 1951) . Atkinson (1957) proposed that people with a high need for achievement will choose a task that is likely to maximize their sense of achievement, which occurs when the probability of success is equal to .50. People with a high need to avoid failure will choose a task that is likely to minimize their sense of failure. The pain of a failure is directly proportional to how easy a task is: It is not humiliating to shoot for the moon and miss, but it is embarrassing, as the saying goes, to shoot an arrow into the sky and miss. Thus, people who want to avoid a sense of failure can do so by choosing tasks at which they are certain to avoid failure (p = 1.00) or tasks at which the pain of failure is minimal (p = .00).
The strength of Atkinson's (1957 Atkinson's ( ,1983 Atkinson & Raynor, 1978) theory is that it recognizes that individuals may differ in risk preference because of psychological mechanisms related to motivation. It also recognizes that there are emotional consequences of making a decision: People enjoy achieving their goals and dislike failing to achieve their goals, and they take these considerations into account when they make a decision. There are serious limitations, however, to using this theory as a general theory of risk preference. The main drawback is that the model is designed to explain decisions about skilled tasks and not about chance events. Although decades of research have supported Atkinson's basic model, there is mixed evidence about how well it predicts decisions made when outcomes are randomly determined, such as in gambling experiments (Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Littig, 1966) . (This raises an interesting question: How do people react to risk that arises from variability in their own performance rather than from variability in the environment [Heath & Tversky, 1991 ] ? Unfortunately, this topic has not received much attention in most decision-making theories.)
A second motivational theory of risky decision making has been proposed by Lopes (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) , which also contains a situational component (level of aspiration) and a personality component (need for security). The situational factor in Lopes's two-factor theory of risk preference, level of aspiration, is defined as the size of outcome for which a person is striving. The specific outcome to which a person aspires depends on both internal standards (e.g., a fairly stable estimate of what constitutes a valuable outcome) and the context of the choice (e.g., the distribution and size of the outcomes of the other alternative). The personality factor, need for security, is measured by assessing risk aversion or risk seekingness in a series of choices that pit a safe option against a risky option with the same expected value. According to Lopes's model, people who favor the sure thing are motivated to seek securitythey are assumed to focus on the worst outcomes that can occur for each alternative. On the other hand, people who favor the risky outcome are motivated to seek potential-they are assumed to focus on the best outcomes that can occur for each alternative. People's preferences are assumed to be a multiplicative function of their need for security and their aspiration level. Schneider and Lopes (1986) have shown that need for security is related to preferences over a range of gambles that differ in variance and skewness of outcomes. For example, a gamble that has a distribution of outcomes skewed toward zero but a top payoff of $439 has a low probability of meeting either group's level of aspiration; however, its great potential is enticing to risk seekers and its poor security is aversive to risk avoiders. As predicted, this long shot was much more likely to be favored by risk seekers than by risk avoiders. The specific preferences of risk seekers and risk avoiders over a range of gambles is predicted quite accurately by Lopes's (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986 ) two-factor theory.
Despite its descriptive strength, Lopes's (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986 ) theory is not a very comprehensive motivational theory of decision making because of its narrow personality mechanism. In fact, it seems tautological to select people who are risk averse and risk seeking to predict risk preference. The theory avoids tautology, however, because, unlike expected utility theory, risk aversion and risk seeking are used as a proxy for a mechanism that Lopes claimed actually mediates risk preference-whether people focus on the best or worst outcomes when making a decision. Lopes provided evidence for this claim, both indirectly, in the pattern of observed choices, and directly, in the protocols people provide when they make decisions (although these were not actually subjected to analysis). Although she offers interesting suggestions about the source of hopes and fears in everyday life, Lopes focused on a rather narrow individual difference. Atkinson's (1957 Atkinson's ( ,1983 Atkinson & Raynor, 1978) model, on the other hand, posits a slightly more general personality mechanism-need for achievement and avoidance of failure-but it is still fairly specific to the task of decision making. A question addressed in this article is whether people's preferences are affected by a more general need for self-protection that could motivate behavior in a number of domains.
All told, the motivational approach to decision making makes a valuable contribution to ideas about risk taking. It introduces both extradecisional factors, such as satisfaction with success and fear of failure, and individual differences in motivation, such as need for security and avoidance of failure. The motivational approach assumes that people are not just concerned with the objective consequences of decisions but also with the affective consequences of decisions and the motivational states that ameliorate or intensify them.
Regret Theory
Avoiding regret in risky decisions. The importance of affect in decision making has been the focus of several theories of anticipated regret proposed by D. E. Bell (1982 Bell ( ,1983 , Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987a) , and Josephs, Larrick, Steele, and Nisbett (1992) . These theories represent a blending of the individual-difference approaches to decision making: They incorporate affective and motivational elements into an expected utility framework. Regret theory proposes that people do not simply combine probabilities and outcomes to arrive at an overall value for an alternative, as both cardinal utility theory and prospect theory assume. Instead, once the outcomes of a decision are known, people compare the outcome of the alternative they chose with the outcome that "might have been" if they had chosen another alternative. This comparison will lead to either feelings of regret-if the other alternative would have turned out better-or rejoicing-if the other alternative would have turned out worse (for a discussion of factors that give rise to regret, see Miller, 1986, and Landman, 1987) . Because people know that they experience these feelings following a decision, they take these feelings into account before they make a decision and calculate for each alternative how much regret and rejoicing they are likely to feel once the outcomes are known. For example, consider the choice between (a) a 100% chance of winning $8 and (b) a 67% chance of winning $12. Imagine that you choose Option B and lose. How much regret would you feel? On the other hand, how content would you feel if you choose Option B and won? Loomes and Sugden (1982) proposed that the amount of regret people feel depends on how the outcome they end up with compares to the outcome they would have had if they had made a different choice.
The key assumption underlying the theory is that larger differences between outcomes produce disproportionately more regret than do smaller differences, as shown in Figure 3 .
2 Applying the regret function to the previous example, the regret produced by choosing Option B and losing (an unfavorable $8 difference) is more than twice the regret produced by choosing Option A and seeing Option B succeed (an unfavorable $4 difference), R(S -0) > 2R(12 -8). As a result, regret theory predicts that people will favor Option A over Option B because Option B has a higher expectation of regret, .33/?(8 -0), than does Option A, .67K02 -8). Loomes and Sugden (1982) predicted that, for most choices involving winning money, people will avoid regret by being risk averse. Loomes and Sugden (1987b; Loomes, 1988) have tested their theory by having subjects make choices such as these for real money. The effect of regret is tested by manipulating the ways in which outcomes of different alternatives co-occur and seeing whether these changes lead to predictable changes in preference. All told, the empirical evidence collected by Loomes and Sugden (1987b; Loomes, 1988) and by others (Battalio, Kagel, & Jiranyakul, 1991; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990 ) has provided only mixed support for their theory. The main drawback to their empirical procedure appears to be a pallid manipulation. Their experiments depend on subjects noticing how the outcomes of the alternatives are configured. Although Loomes and Sugden's approach provides an elegant test of their theory, it is not very robust.
A more robust test for the effect of regret is suggested by D. E. Bell's version of regret theory. D. E. Bell (1982 Bell ( ,1983 Bell ( ,1985 has proposed that the most important determinant of regret is the presence or absence of feedback on foregone alternatives. D. E. Bell observed that, as regret is a function of what is learned about the outcome of the foregone alternative, it is of much greater concern when the foregone alternative will be resolved than when it will remain unresolved. Situations vary in how much people expect to learn about the outcomes of their decisions: Sometimes people expect to learn nothing (e.g., when the consequences are remote), other times people expect to learn only about the option they have chosen but nothing about the "road not taken," and other times people expect to learn about the outcome of both the alternative they have chosen and the alternative they have passed up. Thus, expecting vivid, concrete feedback about what definitely would have occurred produces a greater potential for regret than pallid, abstract knowledge of what statistically was likely to occur.
D. E. Bell's (1983) claim received indirect support in a study by Tindale (1989) , which showed that the amount of feedback people expected to receive affected how confident they were about their decisions. People who expected no feedback showed the most confidence in their decision, those who expected feedback on their chosen alternative showed an intermediate amount of confidence, and those who expected feedback on foregone alternatives showed the least confidence. Presumably, the more feedback people expected to receive, the greater was the potential for regret and the lower people's confidence. However, when Kelsey and Schepanski (1991) performed a direct test of the relationship between feedback and risk preference, they found that differences in the expectation of feedback did not affect the amount of risk that people took. An explanation for this null result was offered by Josephs et al. (1992) in a modified version of regret theory.
Protecting the self from regret. Josephs et al. (1992) started with the assumption that the expectation of feedback creates the possibility for regret and added a second dimension: people's vulnerability to feeling regret. They proposed that people want to maintain a good self-image when they make a decision (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Greenwald, 1980; Steele, 1988; Taylor&Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988) and that regret threatens people's self-image because it can lead them to question the wisdom of their original decision (Sugden, 1985) . However, people are differentially susceptible to threats to their self-image, and it is people who are vulnerable to feeling regret who will make decisions that minimize the possibility of regret. The specific variable that Josephs et al. examined was self-esteem. In line with several social psychological theories about the self, Josephs et al. assumed that people with low self-esteem are more vulnerable to threats to their self-image because they have fewer means of defending against a threat; people with high self-esteem, on the other hand, can have a decision turn out poorly but draw on various defenses or illusions to maintain their positive self-image (Steele, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988) . For example, subjects with low self-esteem have been shown to be more upset and more demotivated by failure (Brockner, 1979; Brockner, Derr, & Laing, 1987; Sweeney & Wells, 1990) and less able to defend their overall self-image from failure (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989 ) than are subjects with high self-esteem, who are more likely to use self-serving attributions to preserve their sense of self-worth (Larrick, 1991) .
Because subjects with low self-esteem are not as prepared to deal with failure as are subjects with high self-esteem, they must use other means to minimize the possibility of failure (see also Baumeister et al., 1989; Baumgardner, Kaufman, & Levy, 1989) . Often these means are preemptive behaviors that include self-handicapping (Harris & Snyder, 1986; Tice, 1991) ; failing strategically to lower expectations (Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987) ; behaving modestly, especially in public (Baumeister et al., 1989) ; and avoiding situations that can expose failure (Strube & Roemmle, 1985) . Thus, Josephs et al. (1992) proposed that subjects with low self-esteem should be more motivated than subjects with high self-esteem to make decisions that reduce the possibility of regret.
Several lines of evidence support the claim that people do in fact protect their self-image when they make decisions. One line of evidence is provided by work on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957 (Festinger, , 1964 Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) . Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that people will feel discomfort after making a difficult decision because the desirable aspects of the foregone alternative and the undesirable aspects of the chosen alternative are discrepant with the choice that was made (Brehm, 1956) . In other words, people are bothered by those aspects of the decision that could make them regret it. Over time, however, people rationalize their decision. Steele (1988) has demonstrated that postdecision rationalization can be explained by the motivation to protect one's self-image. Specifically, people who have been protected from regret by being reminded of something good about themselves show less rationalization than do people who are unprotected from regret (Steele, 1988) . Furthermore, people with high self-esteem show less rationalization than do people with low self-esteem (Insko & Gilmore, 1984; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, in press) .
A second line of evidence was provided by Josephs et al. (1992; Larrick, 1991) , who extended the self-protection perspective to decisions under risk. The two factors Josephs et al. examined were (a) the amount of feedback that subjects expected and (b) the subjects' self-esteem. They proposed that expecting to learn about the outcomes of foregone alternatives creates the possibility for regret and having low self-esteem makes people vulnerable to feeling regret. They tested this hypothesis in several studies that manipulated how much feedback people expected to receive about the outcomes of their decisions. As predicted, they found that expecting to learn about the outcomes of foregone alternatives led people with low self-esteem to make choices that minimized the possibility of regret. Subjects with low self-esteem were more risk averse when they expected feedback on their decisions and were more likely to shield themselves from learning about the outcomes of desirable foregone alternatives. Subjects with high self-esteem, on the other hand, never made regret-minimizing choices. These results indicate that the ability to maintain a good selfimage in the face of regret is an important factor in determining risk preference.
Several other studies have also examined whether people protect their self-image by avoiding feedback on foregone alternatives. (Similar behaviors have been studied in the cognitive dissonance literature; see Frey, 1986 .) Consistent with this prediction, Northcraft and Ashford (1990) found that subjects with low self-esteem were less likely to seek feedback on their decisions than were subjects with high self-esteem. However, other studies have found a contrary pattern (Knight & Nadel, 1986; Weiss & Knight, 1980) ; the actual relationship between self-esteem and information search may depend on whether the negative information is useful in preventing future failure (Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993) .
Research on social comparison theory suggests that the avoidance of feedback on decision outcomes may extend to interpersonal situations as well. For example, one perspective on social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) contends that unfavorable social comparisons can damage a person's selfimage (Cruder, 1977; Hakmiller, 1966; Tesser, 1988; Wills, 1981) . Several studies have shown that subjects with low self-esteem are more adversely affected by unfavorable social comparisons and more likely to avoid them than are subjects with high self-esteem (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Smith & Insko, 1987) . Social comparison is important in decision making because people are sensitive to feedback on other people's outcomes (McClintock & McNeel, 1966) and are extremely dissatisfied when they receive an inferior outcome (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989) . This dissatisfaction should be even greater when another person's outcome reflects directly on one's own decision-making ability. For example, if two people face the same decision but make different choices, then learning of the other person's superior outcome could lead to regret and envy. One strategy for minimizing this threat is to avoid feedback on the other person's outcome (Brickman & Bulman, 1977) . Another strategy is to choose the same option as the other person. The latter prevents the possibility of doing worse, and it guarantees that, if the outcome is misery, there will at least be company. Although these hypotheses are untested, social comparison theory represents a promising area for extending the self-protection approach.
Overall, the self-protection approach offers several advantages over other theories of decision making. First, the results it predicts and finds cannot be accounted for by the psychophysical and cognitive theories. Specifically, none of the universal theories predicts that changing the amount of feedback people expect to receive on the outcomes of their decision would affect subjects' risk preferences. The expectation of feedback leads people with low self-esteem to make defensive choices even though the objective description of the alternatives-the probabilities and payoffs-remains constant. In addition, prospect theory and cardinal utility theory, by proposing basic universal mechanisms, cannot account for individual differences in risk preference.
Second, the self-protection approach focuses on a more general psychological difference than do the individual-difference theories of Atkinson (1957 Atkinson ( , 1983 Atkinson & Raynor, 1978) and Lopes (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) . Self-image protection is not as narrow as need for achievement or need for security. It represents a general set of processes that explains behavior across a range of disparate domains. As such, it has the potential to serve as an important unifying variable in a psychological theory of decision making. The importance of this factor suggests that other aspects of the decision process might be fruitfully examined from this perspective. For example, one strategy for protecting self-image is to make a choice that is easy to justify. Then, even if the decision turns out poorly, it is still possible to demonstrate the original merit of the decision both to yourself (to prevent regret) and to others (to prevent embarrassment). Simonson (1989) has found that people do in fact favor justifiable alternatives when they must choose between alternatives that are difficult to compare. For example, is it better to buy a gas guzzler that has a 5-year warranty but only gets 25 miles to the gallon or a subcompact that has only a 2-year warranty but gets 42 miles to the gallon? This decision is difficult because it is not clear how to make a trade-off between gas mileage and warranty. In situations such as this, people increase their preference for a given alternative if a similar, inferior alternative is added to the choice set. For example, if an inferior subcompact is added to the choice set (one that has a 1-year warranty and gets 40 miles to the gallon), people shift their preference to the original subeompact. Simonson suggested that the new, inferior alternative makes the dominant alternative easier to justify. In support of his contention, he found that this effect was significantly greater when people expected to explain their decision to someone else. Thus, in the face of public scrutiny and potential embarrassment, people minimized the threat by favoring the most justifiable alternative. The self-protection view suggests that some people will be more susceptible to the threat of evaluation and more likely to make justifiable choices. The tendency to justify choices is one of many decision phenomena that would be interesting to study from a self-protection perspective.
In sum, these studies support the claim that people anticipate potential negative consequences of a decision and act in ways to defend against them. In particular, people who are vulnerable to threats to their self-image behave in ways that protect them from unfavorable information about their decisions. However, there are several important drawbacks to the self-protection view of decision making. First, it only describes how people use decisions to protect their self-image; it does not describe how people might use the decision process to enhance their self-image. For example, perhaps risk taking can boost self-image. The positive consequences that decision making might have for self-image are largely ignored in the current version of the theory. This is significant because such factors might be particularly important in the behavior of people with high self-esteem. A second drawback to the self-protection perspective is that it does not specify under what conditions individuals with high self-esteem will be concerned with regret. The theory assumes that self-esteem serves as a buffer but not as an insurmountable one. So when the stakes are high enough, everyone will behave defensively. At what point will people with high self-esteem become defensive? Finally, another factor to consider is how people might protect their self-image in ways other than making a defensive choice. For example, perhaps people reaffirm their competence by reminding themselves of an important accomplishment that is unrelated to the decision at hand. Steele (1988) has suggested this possibility, but no one has examined it directly. Future research on the self should provide greater understanding about self-processes and address many of these drawbacks.
Integrating Explanations for Risk Preference
Two types of psychological explanation are typically offered in theories of decision making under risk. One type attributes risk preference to basic processes common to all people. Theories that are based on this perspective tend to focus on "colder" psychophysical and cognitive processes. For example, these theories propose that fundamental physiological and perceptual mechanisms lead to universal risk preferences. The other type of explanation attributes risk preference to individual differences. Theories that are based on this perspective tend to focus on "hotter" affective and motivational processes. For example, these theories propose that situational and person-ality factors heighten motivational concerns and lead to systematic differences in risk preference. Taken together, these explanations suggest that people focus on two goals when they make decisions. One goal is to maximize their expected outcomes; the other goal is to maintain a positive self-image. A comprehensive theory of decision making would reflect both goals. Ideally, such a theory would also include as few parameters as possible.
How might a comprehensive theory of decision making be constructed? One approach would be to conduct critical tests of different theories and retain only the most important factors. It is not clear at this point whether such tests would tip the scales in favor of psychophysical or motivational factors. However, constructing such critical tests might be difficult. For example, a study that had high external validity would probably involve large, real stakes. In this case, both psychophysics and self-relevance would be more pronounced. Thus, these factors may be difficult to unconfound in actual studies.
A second and more fruitful approach would be to integrate the two goals within the same theory. Of the extant theories, expected utility theory offers the greatest potential for encompassing both of these dimensions in a formal framework. D. E. Bell (1983 Bell ( ,1985 has demonstrated how a utility function can be decomposed into measures reflecting cardinal utility, attitude about risk, and attitude about regret. However, one drawback of expected utility theory that has already been discussed is that it is not a psychological theory of decision making and is not intended to be. It is not interested in explaining why people hold a certain attitude about risk or regret; it simply summarizes people's preferences.
This article suggests that a psychological theory of decision making should focus on the psychological variables that affect the processes underlying risk preference: psychophysics and self-protection. This characterization raises two questions: (a) What psychological variables affect each of these processes? and (b) What is the relationship between these processes in determining risk preference? In response to the first question, psychophysical factors are assumed to be relatively stable and universal-perhaps even hardwired. Although there may be individual differences in the psychophysics of probabilities and outcomes, such differences have yet to be systematically identified. However, even if differences between individuals exist, the process's hardwired nature should produce relatively stable judgments for a given individual. On the other hand, the selfprotection dimension is more clearly influenced by personality and situational variables. Specifically, as the threat from a situation increases, or as the person's ability to maintain a sense of competence decreases, motivational factors will lead to more defensive behavior.
The answer to the second question-What is the relationship between the two processes?-may in fact be related to the issue of stability. If psychophysical processes are indeed stable, they should be a factor in all decisions, and they should be the strongest determinant of risk preference when motivational factors are absent. However, as situational and personality factors create a greater need for self-protection, people will depart more from the psychophysical pattern in the direction of defensive behavior. In sum, I propose that psychophysical processes lie at the core of decision making but are surrounded by a layer of motivational processes. In the absence of threat, the motivational processes are not significant; but as the potential for threat is increased, the motivational processes play a larger and larger role. Although this proposal is necessarily tentative, it is consistent with the pattern of results obtained by Josephs et al. (1992) on regret. Such an approach should prove useful in understanding the role of other motivational factors.
Conclusion
A review of the psychological assumptions made in decisionmaking theories suggests that important factors are often ignored in cognitive and economic theories. Work by Atkinson (1957 Atkinson ( ,1983 Atkinson & Raynor, 1978) ; D. E. Bell (1982 Bell ( ,1983 Bell ( , 1985 ; Josephs et al. (1992) ; Loomes and Sugden (1982; 1987a; Sugden, 1985) ; and Lopes (1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986) demonstrates that a complete theory of decision making must take into account the motivational and emotional consequences of making a decision that go beyond the stated probabilities and outcomes of different alternatives. Such consequences are many. Some important ones to consider are feelings that arise from learning that a decision has turned out poorly, such as failure, regret, and disappointment (Loomes & Sugden, 1986) ; feelings that arise from publicly made decisions, such as embarrassment and pride (Simonson, 1989; Tetlock, 1985) ; and feelings that arise from how outcomes are distributed among people, such as envy and gloating (Loewenstein et al., 1989) , to name just a few. This is a tentative list, however, and much remains to be learned about the role of such factors in decision making.
This review proposes that a complete understanding of decision making must take into account both psychophysical and motivational explanations of behavior. Although a comprehensive theory would not be as elegant as any of the existing theories of choice, it need not be a disjointed list of effects, either. Instead, the central concepts of psychophysics and self-protection can serve as organizing dimensions in a complete theory of decision making.
